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Abstract
Using a combination of rich administrative and household survey data, we document a series of
new facts on earnings inequality and dynamics in a developing country with a large informal sec-
tor: Brazil. Since the mid-1990s, both inequality and volatility of earnings have declined significantly
in Brazil’s formal sector. Higher-order moments of the distribution of earnings innovations show
similar cyclical movements in Brazil as in developed countries like the U.S. Earnings mobility is com-
paratively high, especially at the bottom of the distribution. Compared to the formal sector, earnings
are more volatile in the informal sector. Workers who switch between sectors experience earnings
innovations that have a positive mean and are positively skewed when moving to the formal sector
but have a negative mean and are negatively skewed when moving to the informal sector. A secular
shift of employment toward the less volatile formal sector since the early 2000s has contributed to a
decline in the economy-wide volatility of earnings.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of many developing and even some developed countries is the presence of a large in-
formal sector in which jobs evade government oversight in the labor market. The informal sector can be
thought of as serving a dual role in the context of labor market dynamics. On one hand, it offers workers
readily available employment in case a worker is laid off or decides to quit due to unfavorable pay or
business conditions in their previous job. Through this channel, the informal sector provides insurance
against labor income risk. On the other hand, it allows workers and firms to avoid costly labor regula-
tions and income taxes, which enhances the efficiency of hiring, firing, and production. This enhanced
efficiency in the informal sector also means that workers are not covered by labor regulations such as em-
ployment protection laws, the minimum wage, social security contributions, and other benefits offered
by formal jobs. Through this channel, the informal sector increases labor income risk.
As part of the Global Income Dynamics Project, we study earnings inequality, volatility, and mobility
in a developing country with a large informal sector: Brazil. Among Brazilian metropolitan regions in
2004, we find that 42 percent of all jobs are informal (i.e., without a formal work permit). At the same
time, earnings inequality and informality rates have declined significantly between the early 2000s and
the late 2010s. This makes Brazil a particularly interesting setting to study for our purposes.
To dissect the distribution of earnings levels and earnings innovations, we use a combination of rich
administrative and household survey data from Brazil covering the period from 1985 to 2017. The ad-
ministrative records cover nearly the universe of formal sector workers in Brazil over those years. We
complement these administrative records with detailed household survey data, which follows individu-
als within households in Brazil’s six largest metropolitan regions in a rotating panel structure from 2002
to 2015. The advantage of the household survey data is twofold. First, it lets us validate our findings on
labor market outcomes in Brazil’s formal sector based on the administrative records. Second, it allows us
to compare earnings levels and earnings innovations between workers in Brazil’s formal and informal
sectors as well as for workers switching sectors between survey waves. In this way, we uncover a set of
new facts for workers within and between the formal and informal sectors of Brazil.
In the first part of the paper, we compute a set of standardized statistics on earnings inequality,
volatility, and mobility in Brazil’s formal sector based on administrative data covering the period from
1985 to 2017. We start by documenting a remarkable decrease in earnings inequality for both men and
women starting around 1995 and lasting until the end of our sample.1 The decrease in overall earnings
inequality is associated with relatively greater compression in the left tail of the distribution, which in
1See Barros et al. (2010) for an overview of recent inequality trends in Brazil.
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turn is due to rapid real earnings growth among bottom earnings percentiles. The decrease in inequality
is also widespread among the lower 95 percent of the distribution. In contrast, the top five earnings
percentiles have fanned out due to growth rates in real earnings that were increasing in ranks between
the 95th and the 99.99th percentiles of the distribution. Earnings inequality across cohorts entering the
labor market also fell over this period, but more so in the upper than in the lower tail of the distribution.
We then turn to earnings dynamics among formal sector workers in Brazil. Overall dispersion in
one-year earnings innovations, conditional on gender-specific controls for worker age and educational
attainment, rose rapidly during Brazil’s volatile economic period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which
included a hyperinflationary episode. This rise in dispersion of earnings innovations is almost entirely
driven by increasing lower-tail dispersion, i.e., greater downside earnings risk. Following the macroe-
conomic stabilization after 1994, the dispersion of earnings innovations decreased markedly, first driven
by a decrease in the lower tail and later followed by a decrease in the upper tail of the distribution. We
also find that the skewness of earnings innovations is strongly procyclical (i.e., lower during recessions)
but without much of a trend, while the kurtosis increased secularly since 1985.
Although inequality in current earnings has fallen dramatically over our period of study in Brazil,
this does not mean that inequality in more permanent earnings has followed the same trend. The re-
lation between current and more permanent inequality is commonly summarized through measures of
earnings mobility (Shorrocks, 1978). We find high levels of earnings mobility in Brazil, compared to con-
current studies for the U.S. (McKinney and Abowd, 2021) and Canada (Bowlus et al., 2021), especially
at the bottom of the distribution. Moreover, the extent of earnings mobility has not changed much over
time, despite the fact that the volatility of earnings innovations has declined. That is, individuals move
across the earnings distribution to the same extent now as in the past. The magnitude of the earnings
change associated with a move between two particular rungs of the earnings distribution is, however,
smaller now, since the underlying earnings distribution is more compressed.
In the second part of the paper, we complement our analysis of Brazil’s formal sector based on ad-
ministrative records with longitudinal household survey data for the six largest metropolitan regions for
2002–2015. We make the two datasets as comparable as possible and use them to validate our findings on
earnings inequality and volatility across datasets. Although there remain important differences between
the two datasets, the evolution of earnings inequality lines up quite closely between administrative and
household survey data. Earnings volatility shows somewhat more diverging trends across the two data
sources—the volatility of earnings changes is flat in the administrative records but decreasing in the
household survey data over the 2002–2015 period. These differences are plausibly due to discrepancies
3
in the coverages, income definitions, and the response rates across data sources.2
We proceed to exploit the longitudinal household survey data to study earnings inequality and dy-
namics within and between the formal and informal sectors. We draw four conclusions. First, mean
one-year residual earnings innovations are similar in formal and informal jobs, but informal innova-
tions are significantly more dispersed, with greater probability mass in both tails of the distribution.
Second, workers who switch between sectors have highly asymmetric earnings innovations: workers
transitioning from the informal to the formal sector tend to make earnings gains while workers making
the opposite transition on average lose earnings. Third, there has been a pronounced decrease in the
dispersion of earnings innovations in the overall economy (i.e., the formal sector pooled with the infor-
mal sector) during the early 2000s followed by a period of stabilization from 2006 onwards. Fourth and
finally, holding everything else fixed, the large employment shift toward the less volatile formal sector
on its own results in a fall in the volatility of earnings corresponding to 50 percent of the total decline
since 2002. In other words, the process of labor market formalization appears to have played an impor-
tant role in the decline in earnings volatility over this period. Together, these facts paint a rich picture of
earnings volatility in Brazil as a developing country with a large informal sector.
Related literature. Our work combines two separate strands of the literature on informality and in-
come dynamics. The first strand of the literature is concerned with informality, which is a characteristic
feature of many developing and even some developed economies—see Ulyssea (2020) for an excellent
review. Meghir et al. (2015) use a subperiod of the same household survey data that we use for the
second part of our analysis. They show that both the distribution of wages and that of firm produc-
tivity substantially overlap between Brazil’s formal and informal sectors. Ulyssea (2018) uses linked
employer-employee survey of informal establishments to document facts about the distribution of (in-
)formal employment across the firm size distribution. Among the drivers behind high levels of infor-
mality in developing countries are high labor regulation costs (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012), weak en-
forcement Seminario-Amez (2021), payroll taxes (Haanwinckel and Soares, 2020), and the incidence of
social policies like the minimum wage and conditional cash transfer programs such as Bolsa Família in
Brazil (Fairris and Jonasson, 2020). We complement their work by studying earnings dynamics within
and between the two sectors, particularly highlighting the importance of the informal sector.
Related work by Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019), Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020), and Dix-Carneiro et
al. (2021) also highlights the role of the informal sector as an insurance mechanism against negative
2In this manner, we contribute to an emerging literature that compares administrative and household survey data in other
lower-income countries such as Argentina (Blanco et al., 2021) and Mexico (Calderón et al., 2021).
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shocks to Brazilian local labor markets in the context of international trade. Building on their insights,
we characterize earnings inequality and dynamics within and between the formal and informal sectors.
We also contribute to a growing literature on the causes of the pronounced decrease in earnings in-
equality in Brazil since the mid-1990s. Firpo and Portella (2019) provide an excellent survey of recent
studies that quantify the importance of falling returns to education and experience (Ferreira et al., 2017),
falling returns to firm productivity (Alvarez et al., 2018), trade liberalization (Gonzaga et al., 2006; Fer-
reira et al., 2007; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015), and the rapid rise of the minimum wage (Engbom and
Moser, 2021)—among other factors—toward this decrease in earnings inequality.
The second strand of the literature is concerned with income dynamics. Earnings dynamics have
been studied in administrative and household survey data in many developed countries (see, for exam-
ple, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995 and Sabelhaus and Song, 2010). A seminal contribution in this area is
that by Guvenen et al. (2014) who use 34 years of social security records to document new facts on the
cyclical properties of higher-order moments of earnings innovations in the U.S. Recent work has shed
further light on the nature of earnings dynamics over the life cycle (Guvenen et al., 2020) and over time
(Bloom et al., 2021) in the U.S. context. Hoffmann and Malacrino (2019) shows that unemployment in-
surance reduces some of the cyclicality in skewness of earnings innovations in Italy. We contribute to
this literature a set of new empirical facts on earnings dynamics in a large developing country. In the
context of Brazil, formal labor market institutions coexist with a large informal sector, which provides
workers with implicit insurance against negative earnings shocks.
A recent study by Gomes et al. (2020) also studies earnings dynamics in Brazil’s formal and informal
sectors. Their analysis is based on different survey data that are nationally representative over the period
from 2012 to 2018. We confirm their finding of greater dispersion in earnings innovations in Brazil’s
informal sector in our data and complement their work in several ways. For instance, by using a longer
panel from 2002 to 2015 in our household survey data and from 1985 to 2017 in our administrative
data, we are able to document secular and cyclical movements over time of higher-order moments of
the distribution of earnings innovations. We also provide a holistic picture of the Brazil’s formal and
informal sectors by jointly studying earnings inequality, volatility, and mobility using a combination of
administrative and household survey data.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structure as follows. Section 2 describes Brazil’s relevant institutional
background from 1985–2017. Section 3 introduces the administrative and household survey data on
which we base our analysis. Section 4 presents a set of standardized statistics pertaining to earnings in-
equality, volatility, and mobility. Section 6 validates findings between the administrative and household
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data and also dissects the role of (in-)formality in Brazil’s labor market. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Brazil’s Macroeconomy from 1985 to 2017
Brazil underwent a transformative yet volatile macroeconomic period between 1985 and 2017. Overall,
Brazil’s economy almost tripled in terms of its purchasing power-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP)
over this period. In between rapid growth spurts, however, there have been severe economic recessions,
with negative GDP per capita growth recorded during the high-inflation period of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the financial crisis of the late 1990s, the Global Financial Crisis around 2008, and again
following the commodity price bust and political turmoil from 2014–2016—see panel (a) of Figure 1.
With rapid growth came other fundamental economic changes for Brazil. Over the period from 1985
to 2017, the services sector has grown from 47 percent to 74 percent of total GDP, while the industrial
sector shrank from 42 percent to 21 percent and the agricultural sector shrank from 11 percent to five
percent, as illustrated by panel (b).
Although this statistic does not fully reflect labor market slack in the presence of a large informal
labor market, Brazil’s unemployment rate fluctuated between three percent in the late 1980s and 13
percent in the early 2000s—see panel (c).
A particularly scarring event in Brazil’s recent macroeconomic history was a prolonged episode of
high inflation that falls into our sample period. Our preferred measure of inflation is based on the Broad
Consumer Price Index Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA) used for the the inflation-
targeting system of the country’s central bank. After fast-rising inflation during the early 1980s, Brazil
eventually suffered from hyperinflation, with annual inflation rates above 6,500 percent, and several
different national currencies before eventually coming under control with the implementation of the
Plano Real in 1994 and being relatively stable thereafter—see panel (d).
Over the same period, Brazil’s currency fluctuated significantly in value, first depreciating signifi-
cantly from the early 1990s until 2002, then appreciating quickly for a decade, and eventually depreciat-
ing again in the wake of a commodity supercycle (Benguria et al., 2021)—see panel (e).
Finally, Brazil implemented several policy changes between 1985 and 2017. Among the most salient
changes is the rapid rise of the minimum wage starting in the early 2000s, which coincided with the
election of the left-leaning Worker’s Party. Over the subsequent decade and a half, Brazil’s minimum
increased by over 100 percent in real terms—see panel (f).3
3Engbom and Moser (2021) and Haanwinckel (2020) show that the rise of the minimum wage had a pronounced impact on
the earnings distribution over this period.
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FIGURE 1. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR BRAZIL, 1985–2017
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Note: Panel (c) is based on data from the PME Antiga survey (January 1985–November 2002) and the PME survey (December 2002–February
2016), which cover Brazil’s six largest metropolitan areas: Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo e Porto Alegre. The dotted
line between November and December 2002 indicates a structural break at the point where the two surveys are pasted together. Source: Panel
(a) plots data from World Bank. Panels (b), (c), (d), and (f) plot data from IPEA. Panel (e) plots data from FRED.
3 Data
In this section we describe the two data sets used in our empirical analysis and our sample selection
criteria. Our administrative data source is the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a linked
employer-employee longitudinal data set that provides nearly universal coverage of formal jobs in
Brazil. We complement our empirical analysis with microdata from the Brazilian monthly labor force
survey Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME) to validate our findings based on administrative data and to
investigate whether income dynamics differ between formal and informal workers.
3.1 Administrative data (RAIS)
Data description. Our main data source is RAIS, which contains the administrative records from Brazil’s
Labor Statistics Dissemination Program (Programa de Disseminação das Estatísticas do Trabalho) within the
Brazilian Ministry of the Economy (Ministério da Economia), formerly the Ministry of Labor (Ministério do
Trabalho), covering nearly the universe of workers in tax-registered firms. Every year, firms must report
information to RAIS on all employees who were on the payroll in the previous year.
Compliance with filling in RAIS is high because of large penalties for late, incomplete, or inaccurate
data. Since the main purpose of RAIS is to administer a federal wage bonus to formal employees, there
are incentives for truthful reporting. RAIS is also used by ministries for administrating an array of social
programs related to the monitoring of formal jobs.
Each observation in RAIS is a worker-establishment match, or job, in a given year. For each job, the
dataset includes worker-related variables (e.g., gender, age, education, and unique worker identifier),
firm-related variables (e.g., sector of activity, establishment size, municipality, and unique establishment
and firm identifiers), and job-related variables (e.g., mean monthly earnings during the current year, con-
tractual weekly hours, tenure, occupation, months of hiring and separation, and reason for separation).
Each worker has a unique identification numbers in RAIS, which allows us to recover the full formal
work history of all individuals in the database. We use data from 1985 to 2017. RAIS is very large,
with an average of around 40 million observations per year, which sums to approximately 1.2 billion job
records for the 1985–2017 period.
Sample selection. We apply some standard filters to the administrative data. First, we drop all workers
without valid identification numbers or with zero earnings. We then restrict the data to workers in the
25–55 age range. Earnings data in RAIS are censored above 120 times the national minimum wage. A
Pareto tail imputation exercise suggests that censored observations correspond to a very small propor-
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tion, approximately 0.01% of the sample. We focus on workers with a meaningful attachment to the labor
market by dropping those with total annual nominal earnings (defined in the next paragraph) below the
equivalent of part-time earnings from three months of employment at the minimum wage.4
Variable construction. Since the period from 1985 to 1994 was characterized by high inflation and mut-
liple national currencies, we use information on mean earnings in terms of multiples of the prevailing
minimum wage as our numeraire throughout. To obtain total annual real earnings, we multiply this
multiple by the mean nominal minimum wage during the present year’s job spell months in current
Brazilian Reais. We then construct total annual nominal earnings for each individual by summing over
all their jobs in RAIS in a given calendar year. Finally, we obtain total annual real earnings by deflat-
ing total annual nominal earnings by the annual mean IPCA. By measuring earnings in this way, we
minimize measurement error related to very volatile nominal variables.
Using the administrative data, we construct the following five variables for individual i of gender
G(i) ∈ {male, female} and age group A(i, t) ∈ {25, 26, . . . , 55} in year t ∈ {1985, 1986, . . . , 2017}:
1. Log total annual real earnings, or “log earnings,” ln yit.
2. Residual log earnings conditional on gender-year-specific age dummies, or “residual earnings,”
ε it = ln yit − ∑
G′,t′,A′
αG′t′A′1[G(i) = G
′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′], (1)
where αG′t′A′ is a gender-year-age-specific coefficient on 1[G(i) = G′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′], which
denotes an indicator for the combination of gender G′, year t′, and age A′.5
3. One-year forward change in residual earnings based on equation (1), or “one-year earnings inno-
vations,”
g1it = ε i,t+1 − ε i,t.
4. Five-year forward change in residual earnings based on equation (1), or “five-year earnings inno-







3 months × MWt, where MWt is the mean prevailing minimum wage over the individual i’s period of employment in year t.
5In Appendix A.2, we present results of an alternative definition of residual earnings that also conditions on the education
group E(i) ∈ {primary, middle, high school, college},
εit = ln yit − ∑
G′ ,t′ ,A′
αG′t′A′1[G(i) = G
′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′]− ∑
G′ ,t′ ,E′
βG′t′E′1[G(i) = G
′, t = t′, E(i) = E′].
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vations,”
g5it = ε i,t+5 − ε i,t.
5. Residual log mean earnings over the previous three years conditional on gender-year-specific age
dummies, or “permanent earnings,”
Pi,t = ln
(






′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′],
where γG′t′A′ is a gender-year-age-specific coefficient on 1[G(i) = G′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′], which
denotes an indicator for the combination of gender G′, year t′, and age A′.
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics on the gender and age composition, the earnings distribu-
tion, and sample sizes for selected years between 1985 and 2017 based on our sample from RAIS data.6
Among the noteworthy features of Brazil’s formal sector over this period are the pronounced increases
in female labor force participation, high school completion, and overall employment with a concurrent
decline in the standard deviation of log earnings.
3.2 Household survey data (PME)
Data description. To study earnings inequality dynamics for both formal and informal workers in
Brazil, we use microdata from PME. The survey was conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, or IBGE) in Brazil’s six largest metropolitan
areas of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Recife since the early
1980s and until 2016, when it was terminated and replaced with a different survey. While active, the
survey was used to compute official unemployment statistics for Brazil.
The rotating panel design of PME is such that the surveys are representative at the metropolitan-
area level in each month. We use data from 2002 to 2015, the so-called PME-Nova (new PME).7 By the
end of the period, the sample covered around 34 thousand households and 95 thousand individuals in
each month. The pooled data for the 2002–15 period feature approximately 7.3 million observations, or
6Table 4 in Appendix A.1 presents more detailed summary statistics on the distribution of earnings for each year between
1985 and 2017. Appendix Tables 5 and 6 show the same statistics separately for men and for women.
7PME underwent a major change in 2002, with a significantly larger questionnaire with more checks on actual labor mar-
ket participation and other variables. The old PME (PME-Antiga), which started in 1982, was then replaced by the new PME.
PME-Nova was discontinued in February 2016 as IBGE has a new national household survey since 2012 with 5-quarter longitu-
dinal information, the PNAD-Contínua. The old PME does not have enough information on employment and income to be of
adequate use for our paper.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DATA (RAIS)
1985 1995 2005 2017
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Share 0.69 0.31 0.64 0.36 0.60 0.40 0.56 0.44
Age:
Mean 35.30 34.90 36.50 36.50 36.80 37.10 37.90 38.00
Std. dev. 7.70 7.40 8.10 7.90 8.30 8.40 8.40 8.40
Education shares:
Middle school 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.13
High school 0.17 0.30 0.22 0.34 0.35 0.45 0.52 0.58
College 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.21
Earnings:
Mean 30,423 21,574 29,099 22,736 26,575 22,788 33,809 29,549
Std. dev. 41,489 25,621 41,774 31,820 42,463 33,887 47,391 38,678
Log earnings:
Mean 9.74 9.50 9.61 9.41 9.59 9.47 9.95 9.84
Std. dev. 1.11 1.01 1.19 1.14 1.07 1.04 0.96 0.94
Observations 10.86 4.83 13.97 7.87 18.40 12.06 23.57 18.71
Note: Table shows summary statistics for select years separately by gender. The omitted education category is primary school. Observations
are in millions. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
around 500 thousand per year on average. The main variables we use are the worker ID, gender, age,
schooling, monthly earnings, labor market status (employed, self-employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force), and information on whether the individual holds a formal work permit (explained below).
Monthly earnings include wage, salary, and bonus payments in gross amounts.
Formal employees in Brazil are hired under the Brazilian labor codes Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho,
CLT. CLT states that each employer has to fill in and sign the individual working card (Carteira de Tra-
balho) when formally hiring a worker in Brazil. 8 After asking if they are employed, PME elicits whether
the worker possesses a signed working card. Since RAIS only covers workers hired under CLT, workers
with a working card correspond to those in the administrative data.
It is important to note that all household surveys run by IBGE are anonymous. IBGE has a long-
established reputation of never granting outsiders access to any personally identifiable information of
respondents.
PME surveys have a similar rotating panel structure as the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the
US. Households are surveyed for two spells of four consecutive months, eight months apart from each
other. That is, households complete four monthly interviews, followed by an eight-month pause, and
8The working card is a booklet with information of all formal labor market history of individuals, including all details of
each job held by each worker - date of hiring, firing, paid vacation periods, absence leaves, etc.
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then by another four monthly interviews. This rotating panel structure means that the months the indi-
vidual is interviewed are the same in two any consecutive years. Interviews are spread evenly within a
month and households are always interviewed in the same week of the month.
Households are correctly identified throughout all eight interviews. However, PME does not assign
the same identification number to each individual in the household across interviews. To reduce attri-
tion, we use an algorithm developed by Ribas and Soares (2008), which identifies the same individual
in each household across interviews using a fuzzy merge based on the combination of reported dates of
birth and genders.9
Sample selection. We make several choices to make the information in the two data sets—RAIS and
PME—as comparable as possible for formal workers. First, we only use data for workers in the 25–55
age range. For the cross-sectional exercises, we construct comparable measures of annual earnings, yit.
Since the panel structure of PME only allows us to follow workers for one year, we also compute 1-year
forward residualized log annual earnings changes.
For comparability reasons, we drop all business owners who contribute to social security and do-
mestic employees in PME since they are not measured in the administrative data. The final sample is
thus composed of formal workers (i.e., employees with a valid working card) and informal workers
(i.e., employees without a valid working card and self employed individuals who do not contribute to
social security). Note that this sample includes workers employed in the public sector. Our main analy-
sis focuses on characteristics of individuals’ primary job, although in Section 6 we discuss multiple-job
holders, which make up less than three percent of all workers.
We apply the following selection criteria. We drop individuals with year-on-year survey attrition or
without positive earnings from any (formal or informal) employment during any of the survey waves
during a year. For the longitudinal statistics, we restrict individuals to who have a full eight months of
nonmissing responses in the two consecutive years. To mimic the top-coding in RAIS, we drop monthly
earnings above 120 times the minimum wage. Finally, we trim observations with annualized incomes
below the equivalent of 1.5 months of full time work at the prevailing minimum wage, which is the
equivalent of the bottom threshold we used in our baseline analysis of RAIS.
In the sectoral analysis, we consider as formal (informal) workers those individuals who only showed
up as formal (informal) employees in all monthly observation within a calendar year. Therefore, when
comparing the earnings dynamics of formal and informal workers, we drop individuals that worked in
9Standardized cleaning procedures and the panel linkage method is available from Data Zoom by PUC-Rio at http://www.
econ.puc-rio.br/datazoom/english/index.html.
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the two sectors within the same year—this worker group accounts for around 10% of the total sample
and we analyze them separately in Section 6.
Variable construction. We construct variables in PME to be analogous to those in the administra-
tive data whenever possible. Since the household survey follows a rotating panel format, we create
seasonal dummy variables that identify each four-month period in the calendar year that the indi-
vidual is interviewed (which we refer to as a survey wave).10 Using the household survey data, we
construct the following three variables for individual i of gender G(i) ∈ {male, female}, age group
A(i, t) ∈ {25, 26, . . . , 55}, and season group S(i, t) ∈ {(Jan-Apr), (Feb-May), . . . , (Jan-Mar; Dec)} in year
t ∈ {2002, 2003, . . . , 2015}:
1. Log total annual real earnings, or “log earnings,” ln yit.
2. Residual log earnings conditional on gender-year-specific age dummies and gender-year-specific
season dummies, or “residual earnings,”
ε it = ln yit − ∑
G′,t′,A′
δG′t′A′1[G(i) = G
′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′]− ∑
G′,t′,S′
ηG′t′S′1[G(i) = G
′, t = t′, S(i, t) = S′],
(2)
where δG′t′A′ is a gender-year-age-specific coefficient on 1[G(i) = G′, t = t′, A(i, t) = A′], which
denotes an indicator for the combination of gender G′, year t′, and age A′, and ηG′t′S′ is a gender-
year-season-specific coefficient on 1[G(i) = G′, t = t′, S(i, t) = S′], which denotes an indicator for
the combination of gender G′, year t′, and season S′.
3. One-year forward change in residual earnings based on equation (2), or “one-year earnings inno-
vations,”
g1it = ε i,t+1 − ε i,t.
10There are twelve seasonal dummies for the cross-section statistics, based on the 4-8-4 panel system: (Jan-Apr), (Feb-May),
(Mar-Jun), (Apr-Jul), (May-Aug), (Jun-Sep), (Jul-Oct), (Aug-Nov), (Sep-Dec), (Jan; Oct-Dec), (Jan-Feb; Nov-Dec), (Jan-Mar; Dec).
For the longitudinal exercises, only a subset consisting of nine seasons is relevant: (Jan-Apr), (Feb-May), (Mar-Jun), (Apr-Jul),
(May-Aug), (Jun-Sep), (Jul-Oct), (Aug-Nov), and (Sep-Dec).
13
4 Earnings inequality and dynamics in Brazil’s formal sector
This section documents patterns of earnings inequality and earnings dynamics in the formal sector in
Brazil using the administrative RAIS matched employer-employee data. In the next section, we turn to
the informal sector and a comparison between administrative and survey data.
4.1 Earnings inequality
All percentiles of the earnings distribution in Brazil experienced significant cumulative real wage growth
over the past 30 years, as illustrated by Figure 3. Wage growth was not, however, monotone. In partic-
ular, real wages fell consistently during the high inflationary years of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Since the extensive macroeconomic reforms undertaken in the early 1990s, however, workers across the
earnings spectrum have seen real wage growth. The patterns are quite similar for men and women.
While all parts of the earnings distribution experienced significant real wage growth since the early
1990s, there is also important heterogeneity across the earnings distribution. In particular, since the early
1990s, earnings have grown disproportionately at the bottom of the earnings distribution. For instance,
since 1995, earnings at the 75th percentile grew by about 10 log points, while at the 25th percentile
they rose by 60 log points. This pattern is reversed at the very top of the earnings distribution, which
experienced widening inequality similar to many developed countries. For instance, earnings at the 99th
percentile rose by more than at the 90th percentile.
14

















































































































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Percentiles of the distribution of log real annual earnings, normalized to 1995. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
As expected given the faster real wage growth at the bottom of the distribution, inequality fell dra-
matically in Brazil starting in the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 3. The 90-10 percentile ratio declined
from three to 2.3. The patterns are again quite similar among men and women. Moreover, the fall in
inequality was particularly pronounced at the bottom of the earnings distribution, as evidenced by the
larger fall in the 50-10 compared to the 90-50 percentile ratio. Nevertheless, also the 90-50 percentile ratio
fell by a significant amount, driven by fast real median wage growth. This large decrease in inequality
is particularly remarkable given that many countries experienced increases in inequality over the same
period. That being said, Brazil continues to be characterized by high levels of inequality.
15
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. σ denotes the standard deviation of log real annual earnings. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
The role of entry conditions. Figure 4 plots lower and upper tail inequality among 25 year olds by
gender over time. As for the aggregate trends, young workers experienced a large decline in inequality
since the early 1990s. In other words, the large overall decline in inequality was not solely the result
of changes in earnings dynamics after labor market entry. Instead, inequality is lower also among labor
market entrants. The compression in the earnings distribution among young workers was again partic-
ularly pronounced at the bottom of the earnings distribution, as evidenced by the larger fall in the 50-10
percentile ratio relative to the 90-50 ratio. Patterns are similar among men and women.
16
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Note: Workers aged 25. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
To further investigate the role of changes in initial conditions versus changes in post-entry life-cycle
dynamics, Figure 5 follows cohorts over time as they age. The earliest cohort for which age 25 is
observed—that which turns 25 in 1985—saw an initial increase in inequality during the first 10 years
followed by a subsequent decline. This initial increase, however, may be the result of a time effect asso-
ciated with the hyper inflation period experienced by Brazil over this period. Subsequent cohorts of men
and women have seen a gradual flattening and eventual reversal of the profile of within cohort inequal-
ity with age. One possible factor behind this interesting pattern is the rapid increase in the minimum
wage over this period. It is well-known that a minimum wage tends to disproportionately impact young
workers, which may have contributed to a particular compression in inequality at labor market entry.
As older workers are less impacted by the minimum wage, inequality has fallen by less at older ages,
ceteris paribus contributing to a steepening of life-cycle inequality profiles.
17
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
4.2 Earnings dynamics
We now turn to trends in earnings dynamics. Figure 6 plots percentile ratios of one-year residual log
earnings changes by gender. Men have somewhat more volatile earnings, although the gender differ-
ences are not particularly pronounced. Negative (positive) earnings shocks became more (less) pro-
nounced during the hyper inflationary years in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Since then, earnings have
gradually become less volatile. The magnitude of negative shocks is counter-cyclical—i.e. such shocks
become more pronounced in recessions—while the magnitude of positive shocks is pro-cyclical.
18
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
Figure 7 plots the skewness and kurtosis of one-year residual earnings changes. As suggested by
Figure 6, the skewness of earnings innovations is pro-cyclical, i.e. negative shocks become more pro-
nounced in recessions. In contrast, it is difficult to conclude much definitive regarding the cyclicality of
the kurtosis. The skewness displays little secular trend over the past 30 years, while the kurtosis has
gradually risen. In other words, the likelihood of very large negative and positive shocks has risen over
time. One possible factor behind this pattern is the decline in informality. In particular, it may be that
workers 20 years ago were more likely to leave the formal sector in response to large negative shocks,
whereas today they tend to remain formally employed (but at much lower earnings). If earnings later
revert, this would account for a higher measured kurtosis today than 20 years ago. A further assessment
of this intriguing pattern is, however, beyond this paper.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
Life-cycle dynamics. Instead of a time series view, Figure 8 studies earnings innovations from a life-
cycle perspective. In particular, it plots the 90-10 percentile ratio, the skewness and kurtosis of one-year
log earnings changes by age group as a function of permanent earnings. Young workers have more
volatile earnings as measured by the 90-10 percentile ratio, as do lower permanent earnings workers
within age groups. There is no pronounced systematic pattern for the skewness. Interestingly, the pattern
for the kurtosis of earnings changes is partly inverted relative to that for the 90-10 percentile ratio. While
low permanent earnings workers also have the highest kurtosis within age groups, older workers have
higher kurtosis than their younger counterparts. That is, young workers are subject to more volatile but
less extreme shocks compared to their older counterparts. Women are less likely to experience negative
earnings shocks as measured by the skewness relative to men, possibly because they are more likely to
drop out of the formal sector in response to such shocks.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Earnings mobility. Figure 9 investigates earnings mobility. In particular, it plots a worker’s average
rank in the earnings distribution 10 years later as a function of her rank in the distribution today, sepa-
rately by age and gender (the appendix contains similar plots for outcomes five years later, with a similar
conclusion). The distribution is ergodic, in the sense that individuals currently at the bottom of the dis-
tribution tend to move up the distribution over time, and vice versa. In the top 60 percent of the earnings
distribution (top 50 for women), individuals on average lose a fraction of their current rank. That is, if
an individual currently is in percentile p of the earnings distribution, 10 years later she is expected to
be in percentile xp, where x ∈ (0, 1). This pattern is quite different in the lower part of the distribution
(lower 40 percent for men; lower 50 percent for women). There, the average rank of individuals 10 years
later is essentially unrelated to their current rank.11 There are no pronounced life-cycle differences in
this pattern.
FIGURE 9. EVOLUTION OF 10-YEAR MOBILITY OVER THE LIFE CYCLE, BY GENDER
(A) MEN
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
Figure 10 conducts the same analysis instead over time. That is, it plots the average rank of workers
10 years later as a function of their rank in the earnings distribution today, separately by year and gender.
The same pattern that holds by age also holds over time. There is no pronounced change in mobility
patterns over time in Brazil. This pattern is particularly interesting in light of the gradual decline in
earnings volatility over this period in Figure 6. That is, individuals move across the earnings distribution
to the same extent now as in the past. Since the underlying earnings distribution is more compressed
11We think the reason for this is that a significant share of the lower tail of the earnings distribution (lower 40 percent for men
and lower 50 percent for women) at any date earn zero earnings today but have positive earnings 10 years later.
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now than in the past, however, the earnings change associated with a move between two particular
rungs of the earnings distribution is smaller.
FIGURE 10. EVOLUTION OF 10-YEAR MOBILITY OVER TIME, BY GENDER
(A) MEN
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
5 Comparing Administrative and Household Survey Data
To what extent do the patterns in administrative data correspond with what households self-report in
surveys? To address this question, we compare our results for the formal sector from the RAIS admin-
istrative data with the PME household survey. We replicate our exercises for the formal sector from the
previous section for the formal sector in the PME. To that end, we restrict the RAIS sample to the subset
of the six metropolitan areas covered by the PME and to 2002–2015 to align with the available data from
the PME. Since trends for men and women are quite similar, we pool both genders in the interest of
space. We also abstract from an analysis of the very top of the earnings distribution and we limit our
discussion of higher order moments of earnings changes, as we believe that the modest sample size of
the PME prevents a reliable analysis of these outcomes.
Figure 11 plots percentiles of the log earnings distribution, normalized to 2002. Note that, in general,
the results based on the RAIS in the left panel differ from those in the previous section, since we now
restriction attention to the subset of the six metropolitan areas covered by the PME. In practice, however,
the time trends correspond closely to the trends in the previous section for the full country. Reassuringly,
the percentile ratios evolve similarly in the administrative and the household survey data.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME and RAIS 2002–2015.
Not surprisingly given that the percentiles line up closely across the two data sets, Figure 12 finds
that also measures of inequality follow similar trends in the RAIS and the PME. That being said, the
household survey data understate the level of inequality in the administrative data—for instance, the
90-10 percentile ratio is higher by almost 30 log points in the RAIS.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME and RAIS 2002–2015.
We next turn to a comparison of earnings dynamics in the administrative and survey data. Figure
13 plots dispersion in one-year earnings innovations in the RAIS and the PME. The two data sets show
24
broadly similar patterns, although with some important differences, especially during the 2002–2006
period. For instance, dispersion in both the top and the bottom of the earnings innovation distribution
fell sharply 2002–2004 according to PME, whereas it was fairly stable in RAIS. One possibility is that
the modest sample size of the PME result in a noisy estimate of the underlying population variance of
earnings innovations. That being said, the two surveys give broadly similar results for the period from
2006, showing a pattern of relative stability.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME and RAIS 2002–2015.
6 The role of (in-)formality in Brazil
How different are the distribution of earnings levels and earnings innovations in the formal informal sec-
tor relative to the formal sector in Brazil? And how has economy-wide earnings inequality and volatility,
pooling Brazil’s formal and informal workers, evolved since 2002? To answer these questions, we ex-
tend our empirical analysis to Brazil’s informal sector, exploiting the joint power of our administrative
and survey data. In particular, we proceed in three steps. First, we dissect the process of labor market
formalization in Brazil over the period from 2002 to 2015. Second, we compare earnings inequality and
dynamics in Brazil’s informal sector to the formal sector. Finally, we quantify the sources of a decline in
earnings volatility in the overall Brazilian economy, pooling the formal and informal sectors.
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6.1 The process of labor market formalization
An analysis of the informal sector is highly relevant in a developing country like Brazil, which is charac-
terized by a large share of informal sector employment as illustrated by Figure 14. The left panel shows
that the informal share has declined over the past 10–15 years, dropping from 39 percent in 2002 to 25
percent in 2015. The right panel dissects the decline across the earnings distribution. In the bottom quar-
tile of the earnings distribution, almost three quarters of workers were in the informal sector in 2002,
while the corresponding figure in the top quartile was 17 percent. Over time, the decline in informality
was particularly pronounced at the bottom of the distribution—the share of the first quartile working in
the informal sector fell by 19 percentage points from 2002 to 2015. Yet, the process of labor market for-
malization was widespread throughout the earnings distribution, with also the share of the top quartile
working in the informal sector declining by seven percentage points. Despite the decline in informality,
however, the informal sector continues to account for over half of employment among workers in the
bottom quartile of the earnings distribution, highlighting its continued importance.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
The decrease in informality in Brazil between 2002 and 2015 is closely related to the evolution of
labor market flow rates over this period. Figure 15 shows the one-year-forward transitions rates between
formal employment and informal employment for formal sector workers in panel (A) and for informal
sector workers in panel (B).12 A first striking observation is that transition rates out of the formal sector
12Figure 41 in Appendix A.3 shows the same time series and also that of transition probabilities from either sector into
nonemployment, which we define as no employment in either the formal or the informal sector.
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(panel (A)) are around four times smaller than transition rates out of the informal sector (panel (B)).
Given that the formal sector is only between one-and-a-half and three times as large as the informal
sector between 2002 and 2015, a balance flow equation tells us that this observation implies a net inflow
into formality over this period. A second striking observation is that the formal-to-informal transition
rate has approximately halved, from around 2.5 percent to around 1.2 percent, over this period. At the
same time, the informal-to-formal transition rate has slightly increased. Exit rates into nonemployment
have been U-shaped in both sectors over this period.
FIGURE 15. EVOLUTION OF SECTORAL FLOW RATES, BY ORIGIN SECTOR
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
There exists significant heterogeneity in sectoral flows across the earnings distribution. Figure 16
plots the mean transition rates as a function of population earnings rank for formal sector workers in
panel (A) and for informal sector workers in panel (B).13 A few points are noteworthy. First, for both
formal and informal workers, the probability of staying in the same sector in consecutive years (i.e.,
the omitted category in each panel of Figure 16) far outweighs that of switching sectors or leaving em-
ployment altogether. Second, formal workers are relatively more attached to their sector than informal
workers. Third, there is a marked decrease in formal-sector exit rates toward informality and nonem-
ployment but an increase in informal-sector exit rates toward formality and nonemployment toward
higher earnings percentiles.
It is reasonable to wonder whether the decrease in the informal employment share in Brazil might
have been driven by changes in the prevalence of multiple-job holding—i.e. a worker holding multiple
13Figure 42 in Appendix A.3 shows the same cross-sectional relationships and also that of transition probabilities from either
sector into nonemployment, which we define as no employment in either the formal or the informal sector.
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FIGURE 16. CROSS-SECTIONAL HETEROGENEITY IN SECTORAL FLOW RATES, BY ORIGIN SECTOR












































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
jobs at the same point in time—of which one or several may be informal. To investigate this, Table 2
summarizes the share of workers who hold multiple jobs in a month, broken down by whether the main
job is in the formal sector (Panel A) or informal sector (Panel B). Multiple job holding is not particularly
common in Brazil, with roughly two percent of employed workers holding multiple jobs. The fraction
is modestly lower among informal sector workers. Among formal sector workers with a second job,
roughly half of them contribute to social security in their second job (a proxy for the formality status
of the second job). Moreover, the (un)importance of multiple job holding has remained roughly stable
over time. Hence, the main margin of formalization is the extensive margin—workers switching entirely
into the formal sector—as opposed to a declining prevalence of multiple job holders working both in the
informal and formal sector.
TABLE 2. INCIDENCE AND EVOLUTION OF MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING RATES
Panel A. Formal sector Panel B. Informal sector
2002–04 2005–08 2009–11 2012–15 2002–04 2005–08 2009–11 2012–15
Share with secondary job (%) 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.2
Average weekly hours in main job 42.8 42.5 42.3 42.0 41.8 41.6 41.0 40.3
Average weekly hours in secondary jobs 17.5 17.2 15.0 16.7 22.2 21.8 20.2 21.6
Share with SS contributions in secondary job 51.2 52.2 54.4 59.1 25.0 23.5 25.7 30.9
Note: Workers aged 25–55. Share of formal/informal employment with a secondary job. Average weekly hours in main job is for the full sample
population conditional on holding a job. Average weekly hours in secondary jobs includes hours worked in all nonprimary (i.e., secondary,
tertiary, etc.) jobs and is computed among the subpopulation of workers with more than one concurrent job. Source: PME 2002–2015.
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6.2 Earnings inequality and dynamics
In parallel to our previous analysis of the formal sector based on administrative data, we start by ana-
lyzing inequality in the informal sector based on household survey data. Figure 17 compares the distri-
bution of residual log earnings across the two sectors in 2003 and 2015.14 As expected, pay is higher in
the formal sector, in a first-order stochastic sense. That being said, there is significant overlap across the
two distributions. Many informal sector workers earn better than their observationally equivalent peers
working in the formal sector. Qualitatively, this pattern has not changed over time.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Figure shows Kernel densities of residual log earnings for 2003 in panel (A) and for 2015 in panel (B). Residual log
earnings are calculated controlling for age and survey wave fixed effects, separately by gender and year. Formal sector includes all employees
with a work permit. Informal sector includes all employees without a work permit and the self-employed. Source: PME 2002–2015.
Figure 18 plots trends in inequality in the formal and informal sector over time.15 Inequality has
declined significantly in both the formal and informal sector over this period, although the fall is more
pronounced in the formal sector. This is particularly true for the log 90-10 percentile ratio. One possi-
bility is that the rapid increase in the minimum wage has contributed to a disproportionate reduction in
inequality in the formal sector, since it only applies there (Engbom and Moser, 2021).
We next assess earnings dynamics in the informal sector. Figure 19 plots the distribution of one-year
residual earnings innovations by worker group. Because workers may change sector across years, we
14We plot the density for 2003 instead of 2002 for comparability reasons because the first interview of the PME-Nova survey
took place in March 2002. In this way, we compare the earliest and latest possible years of data with coverage of all calendar
months.
15Note that because we focus here on the PME sample procedure, the pattern for the formal sector differs slightly from that
in Figure 12 which uses the RAIS sample procedure, even though both figures use the PME data.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
construct four mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive groups: those who work in the formal sector
in both year t and t + 1—henceforth formal-formal workers—those who work in the informal sector in
both years—informal-informal workers—and those who work in the formal/informal sector in year t but
the informal/formal sector in year t + 1—formal-informal and informal-formal, respectively. Informal-
informal workers have more volatile earnings than formal-formal workers, with a higher prevalence of
both large negative and positive earnings innovations. Of course, this pattern should not be interpreted
in a causal sense, as workers likely are not randomly assigned to sector. Formal-informal workers tend
to experience earnings losses, while the opposite is true among informal-formal workers. The fact that
a given worker experiences an earnings change when switching sectors suggests that the lower average
earnings in the informal sector is not purely due to worker selection (Alvarez, 2020).
Table 3 summarizes the first four moments of one-year residual earnings innovations across the four
groups of workers. For comparison, we also include the corresponding moments for the US based on
Guvenen et al. (2020). The average residual earnings change is not zero within groups, because the we
do not let observable controls vary flexibly by sector. That being said, average residual earnings changes
are small among formal-formal and informal-informal workers. In contrast, as already suggested by
Figure 19, workers who switch sector experience large residual earnings changes. Moreover, the average
gain of workers switching into the formal sector is close to the average loss of workers leaving the formal
sector. At face value, this symmetry speaks against theories of comparative advantage driving worker
mobility across sectors. Under such a view, one may have expected that either all workers would make
30
















Note: Workers aged 25–55. All panels. Kernel densities of one-year change in residual log earnings by worker group. Residuals are calculated
controlling for age and survey wave fixed effects, separately by gender and year. Workers aged 25–55. Different lines denote different combi-
nations of workers’ current and next survey wave’s sector of employment (e.g., “Formal-Informal” denotes current employment in the formal
sector and next survey wave’s employment in the informal sector). Source: PME 2002–2015.
wage gains upon sector switching, or that the patterns of gains and losses would be asymmetric.16
Furthermore, as also suggested by Figure 19, the standard deviation of earnings innovations is higher
in the informal sector than the formal sector. Indeed, while the overall standard deviation of earnings
innovations is similar to the US, the volatility within the informal sector is closer to that among low paid
workers in the US. The standard deviation is even higher among workers who switch sector across years.
For completeness we report also higher order moments in Table 3, but we caution against attaching too
much weight to these higher order moments given the modest sample size of the PME.
6.3 Understanding the aggregate decline in earnings volatility in Brazil
In this final section of the paper, we decompose the sources of an aggregate decline in earnings volatility
in Brazil over this period, as illustrated by Figure 20. Pooling all worker groups in the left panel—
formal-formal, informal-informal, formal-informal and informal-formal—earnings volatility fell in the
16That is, suppose that there is an average earnings penalty ω from working in the informal sector—for instance because the
worker does not have to pay taxes on informal income such that, all else equal, a worker may require lower gross pay in the
informal relative to the formal sector. If some workers are better suited for the informal sector and workers sort based on this,
we would expect workers who move into the informal sector to experience an earnings change > −ω while those who switch
into the formal sector experience an earnings increase > ω. In other words, the earnings changes of switchers are asymmetric.
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TABLE 3. ONE-YEAR LOG EARNINGS CHANGE MOMENTS: 2002-14
Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A. Brazil
All of Brazil -0.007 0.52 -0.06 7.35
Formal-Formal -0.014 0.38 -0.17 9.63
Informal-Informal -0.009 0.65 -0.06 4.92
Formal-Informal -0.388 0.88 -0.09 3.46
Informal-Formal 0.362 0.81 0.06 3.57
Panel B. US (Guvenen et al., 2020)
Median earnings (P50) 0.49 -1.35 16.81
High earnings (P90) 0.43 -1.62 26.2
Low earnings (P10) 0.73 -0.72 6.78
Note: Workers aged 25–55. Mean, standard deviation, 3rd and 4th standardized moments of one-year residual log earnings change. Residuals
are calculated controlling flexibly for age and survey wave fixed effects, separately by gender and year. Source: Panel A is based on PME
2002–2015. Panel B is based on US statistics from Guvenen et al. (2020) for men in age group 3 (age 35–39) based on the Online Data Appendix
“Moments For Men” tab “L1_log_age_re.”
early 2000s and subsequently leveled out, mirroring the patterns in the formal sector. Given differ-
ences across sectors in the volatility of earnings combined with labor market formalization in Brazil
over this period, this aggregate trend is in turn the result of changes in composition and within-sector
changes in volatility. In particular, the employment composition has shifted significantly toward formal-
formal workers—i.e. workers who are in the formal sector in both year t and year t + 1—and away from
informal-informal workers. In contrast, the share of workers who work in both sectors across the two
years has remained relatively small.
To understand the role of compositional shifts behind the overall change in the volatility of earn-
ings over this period, we start by conducting a between/within decomposition of the variance of one-
year changes in residual log earnings across the formal-formal, informal-informal, formal-informal and
informal-formal worker groups. That is, at a point in time, the overall variance of residual earnings










































∆it is the grand average residual in year t and ∆st = 1Nst ∑i∈s ∆it is the average residual
within group s in year t. Note that the former is not zero by construction because we residualize earnings
and not earnings changes. In a balanced panel, the fact that the levels sum to zero in each year would
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Residuals are calculated controlling for age and survey wave fixed effects, separately by gender and year. Source:
PME 2002–2015.
imply that also earnings changes sum to zero, but because our panel is unbalanced this needs not hold.17
Note that the latter is not zero by construction, because the age and education effects do not vary by
group (and in addition the panel is not balanced).
Because different groups are characterized by different volatility of earnings, two factors in turn
contribute to changes in the within component in (3) over time.18 First, ceteris paribus, changes in the em-
ployment weights, NstNt , of groups in (3) lead to changes in overall volatility through a composition channel.
Second, within-group changes in volatility, 1Nst ∑i∈s(∆it −∆st)
2, lead to changes in overall volatility, hold-
ing composition fixed, which we refer to as the return channel.
The top left panel of Figure 21 decomposes the overall change in the variance of earnings changes
into its between and within components based on (3). Changes within groups in the volatility of earnings
account for the great majority of the fall in earnings volatility over this period. The right panel isolates
the role of these two forces using a shift-share analysis (as is standard in shift-share analysis, the two
components do not add up to the total change). That is, to compute the composition channel, we hold
the within-group variances fixed at their initial level and change only the employment weights as in the


























which is zero since both 1Nt+1 ∑i wit+1 = 0 and
1
Nt ∑i
wit = 0 by the nature of both being the sum of OLS residuals.
18While the same is true also for the between component in (3), we focus on the within component since that accounts for the
great majority of the changes in volatility over this period.
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data. To compute the return channel, we hold the employment weights fixed at their initial level and
change only the within-group variances as in the data. Within-group changes lead to a larger decline in
volatility than compositional shifts, although the effect of the latter is also significant. The composition
effect arises primarily as employment has gravitated toward formal-formal workers over this period,
which is characterized by lower volatility of earnings.
FIGURE 21. DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGE IN VOLATILITY




















Note: Workers aged 25–55. Panel A. Between/within decomposition of the variance of earnings innovations based on (3). Panel B. Shift-share
analysis of the within component of (3). Return channel: Holding the sector composition fixed at its initial level and letting the within group
variances evolve as in the data. Composition channel: holding the within group variances fixed at their initial level and letting the sector
composition evolve as in the data. Source: PME 2002–2015.
The limited explanatory power of demographics. In a similar spirit to the between/within decom-
position (3) of the total variance of earnings innovations across the four worker groups formal-formal,
informal-informal, informal-formal and formal-informal, we further decompose the variance of earn-
ings innovations among formal-formal and informal-informal workers into its between versus within
components across four education groups. We restrict attention to these two worker groups because
they constitute the great majority of Brazilian employment. Subsequently, motivated by the fact that the
within-education group component accounts for the great majority of changes in the volatility of earn-
ings among formal-formal and informal-informal workers, respectively, we further consider a shift-share
analysis of the within-education group component in the same spirit as above. We focus on educational
composition because Brazil experienced a rapid increase in educational attainment over this period.19
19In unreported results, we find that compositional shifts in other demographic dimensions such as age and gender account
for even less of the overall changes over this period.
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Figure 22 plots the results of these exercises. As noted above, the great majority of the decline in the
volatility of earnings among formal-formal and informal-informal workers, respectively, is accounted
for by the within component. The great majority of the fall in the within component is, in turn, driven by
changes within education groups in the variance of earnings, as opposed to changes in the educational
composition of the workforce combined with differences across education groups in their volatility of
earnings. The reason is that although Brazil has seen rapid changes in educational composition over
this period, the differences across education groups in the within-education group volatility of earnings
are not that large. While the findings of these type of accounting exercises should be cautiously inter-
preted absent an equilibrium model, at face value they do suggest a limited role for rising educational
attainment in driving the fall in earnings volatility among formal-formal and informal-informal workers.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we documented new facts on earnings inequality, dynamics, and mobility in a developing
country with a large informal sector: Brazil. Among workers in Brazil’s formal sector, there has been
a remarkable decrease in earnings inequality, driven by bottom-led growth in real earnings, since the
late 1990s. At the same time, the dispersion of earnings innovations decreased markedly. Higher-order
moments of the distribution of earnings innovations differ in levels but show cyclical movements similar
to those previously documented in developed countries such as the U.S. Earnings mobility is compar-
atively high in Brazil, especially at the bottom of the distribution. We also studied earnings inequality
and dynamics in Brazil’s formal and informal sectors. Compared to formal sector workers, there is sig-
nificantly higher dispersion of earnings innovations among informal sector workers and significantly
skewed earnings innovations among sector switchers. We found a large decrease in the economywide
dispersion of earnings innovations, which is mostly driven by the within-sector evolution of earnings
volatility.
A promising avenue for future research is to shed further light onto the microeconomic sources of
the decline in earnings inequality and volatility that we document and also to assess its macroeconomic
consequences.
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FIGURE 22. THE ROLE OF CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT








































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Left panels. Between/within decomposition of the variance of earnings innovations within the formal-formal (top)
or informal-informal (bottom) worker groups based on (3) across four education groups. Panel B. Shift-share analysis of the within-education
group component of (3) across four education groups within the formal-formal (top) or informal-informal (bottom) worker groups. Return
channel: Holding the education composition fixed at its initial level and letting the within group variances evolve as in the data. Composition
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A.1 Additional summary statistics
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TABLE 4. CROSS-SECTIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS, OVERALL
Year Obs. Mean Std. dev. P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.9 P99.99
1985 15.7 19,852 26,915 585 1,755 3,121 5,881 11,105 22,696 44,737 67,256 134,110 255,402 425,948
1986 16.9 20,627 26,716 635 1,751 3,038 5,932 11,865 24,215 47,043 69,680 134,984 224,955 387,154
1987 17.6 18,824 27,220 429 1,364 2,496 5,009 10,438 21,323 42,172 64,080 134,699 290,922 403,407
1988 18.6 18,859 27,307 291 1,148 2,430 4,910 10,045 21,266 42,977 66,632 137,842 256,362 396,512
1989 19.3 18,591 27,174 231 935 2,319 4,835 9,839 20,902 41,922 65,923 139,556 254,659 387,672
1990 19.7 15,268 21,970 232 962 1,873 3,766 8,078 17,521 34,687 54,200 112,631 199,526 297,985
1991 19.5 14,533 20,786 319 1,021 1,915 3,861 7,833 16,536 32,834 51,001 104,857 192,177 315,036
1992 19.4 14,399 20,297 202 826 1,804 3,936 7,844 16,229 33,058 50,913 101,826 189,134 277,698
1993 20.1 15,728 23,111 162 766 1,899 4,178 8,239 17,393 36,211 56,422 117,313 217,039 324,278
1994 20.7 16,524 23,245 244 1,046 2,074 4,260 8,671 18,903 38,908 58,775 117,161 211,849 305,908
1995 21.8 19,214 27,671 502 1,345 2,336 4,723 9,921 21,786 45,038 69,210 141,114 253,044 348,350
1996 21.9 19,335 27,785 574 1,457 2,468 4,991 10,250 21,771 44,745 68,389 141,832 262,035 373,896
1997 22.3 19,434 28,048 594 1,518 2,552 5,099 10,342 21,726 44,565 68,732 143,569 264,084 384,921
1998 22.9 19,869 29,077 623 1,581 2,687 5,301 10,594 22,129 44,593 69,648 148,988 282,161 412,739
1999 23.1 19,153 28,001 613 1,544 2,628 5,230 10,257 21,224 42,486 67,007 144,740 271,705 392,265
2000 23.7 19,013 28,187 608 1,516 2,613 5,214 10,116 20,932 42,019 66,764 146,056 276,394 393,854
2001 25.4 19,133 29,659 619 1,543 2,648 5,268 9,954 20,582 42,124 66,775 151,038 311,010 464,091
2002 26.4 18,756 30,505 623 1,551 2,660 5,292 9,708 20,055 41,195 65,011 147,759 313,361 474,376
2003 27.4 17,699 27,930 596 1,527 2,596 5,170 9,236 18,791 38,405 60,946 138,945 306,786 475,542
2004 28.8 18,017 28,201 623 1,600 2,730 5,386 9,543 19,086 39,022 61,793 140,291 305,658 486,266
2005 30.5 17,974 28,196 628 1,614 2,752 5,533 9,554 18,908 38,617 61,227 140,834 304,485 489,218
2006 32.3 18,645 29,425 664 1,736 2,955 5,992 9,892 19,412 39,774 62,802 145,559 335,661 522,767
2007 34.2 18,996 29,772 681 1,781 3,055 6,261 10,154 19,745 40,513 63,629 147,545 339,696 530,402
2008 36.5 19,464 30,495 722 1,884 3,173 6,445 10,413 20,210 41,296 64,882 151,420 339,068 544,611
2009 37.9 19,866 30,908 721 1,864 3,209 6,813 10,740 20,559 42,126 66,313 154,799 333,382 551,067
2010 40.4 20,392 31,395 773 2,017 3,451 7,150 11,161 21,166 42,969 67,674 156,655 339,306 568,684
2011 42.4 20,773 31,431 804 2,081 3,547 7,277 11,545 21,745 43,702 68,351 156,676 333,256 582,293
2012 43.9 21,589 31,614 858 2,247 3,841 7,886 12,290 22,813 45,472 70,051 157,155 326,983 577,155
2013 45.1 22,085 31,783 887 2,326 3,942 8,120 12,692 23,572 46,434 71,300 158,852 328,978 587,556
2014 45.9 22,602 32,090 924 2,454 4,104 8,313 13,143 24,181 47,504 72,443 161,116 331,021 589,361
2015 44.9 22,566 31,988 929 2,509 4,242 8,457 13,199 23,947 47,263 72,238 160,124 336,925 588,808
2016 43.0 22,342 30,764 954 2,577 4,363 8,665 13,312 23,864 46,388 70,941 154,707 317,613 563,472
2017 42.3 22,882 31,395 975 2,660 4,498 8,940 13,702 24,396 47,287 72,435 158,572 317,728 571,961
Note: Workers aged 25-55. Source: RAIS 1985-2017.
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TABLE 5. CROSS-SECTIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS, MEN
Year Obs. Mean Std. dev. P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.9 P99.99
1985 10.9 21,806 29,738 604 1,810 3,261 6,253 12,064 24,781 49,741 75,852 147,933 276,815 452,345
1986 11.5 22,594 29,240 694 1,908 3,338 6,467 12,983 26,291 51,689 78,045 147,480 240,500 411,612
1987 11.9 20,694 29,192 478 1,483 2,753 5,566 11,583 23,246 46,531 72,300 147,748 279,048 407,918
1988 12.5 20,678 29,802 310 1,199 2,529 5,287 11,099 23,169 47,432 73,964 151,087 273,212 414,375
1989 12.9 20,447 29,666 242 954 2,390 5,206 10,947 22,825 46,691 73,473 152,709 269,575 397,090
1990 13.0 16,529 23,716 246 1,002 1,951 4,039 8,869 18,787 37,744 59,386 121,774 210,552 315,132
1991 12.9 15,800 22,601 335 1,052 1,983 4,109 8,597 17,775 35,778 56,068 114,615 202,884 340,364
1992 12.7 15,789 22,315 208 821 1,794 4,111 8,613 17,770 36,652 56,589 112,009 200,857 298,910
1993 13.1 17,225 25,278 166 747 1,851 4,356 9,037 18,915 40,227 62,608 128,325 231,322 349,415
1994 13.4 17,821 25,239 248 1,050 2,098 4,470 9,391 20,162 41,854 64,054 128,022 225,410 324,779
1995 14.0 20,857 29,942 524 1,399 2,442 5,045 10,859 23,422 48,993 75,825 153,967 265,982 369,637
1996 13.9 20,897 30,184 599 1,512 2,569 5,301 11,112 23,125 48,491 75,210 154,839 276,879 392,875
1997 14.1 20,874 30,399 612 1,533 2,617 5,362 11,132 22,875 47,940 75,304 156,928 279,669 402,947
1998 14.4 21,114 31,347 638 1,590 2,702 5,548 11,307 22,916 47,183 75,734 162,362 298,428 432,973
1999 14.3 20,281 30,187 628 1,539 2,616 5,420 10,891 21,868 44,684 72,806 157,247 288,153 413,110
2000 14.7 19,991 30,046 628 1,523 2,615 5,381 10,710 21,554 43,731 71,470 157,184 291,335 409,962
2001 15.7 20,302 32,017 629 1,558 2,671 5,468 10,556 21,361 44,346 72,585 163,447 333,319 482,633
2002 16.2 19,775 33,302 654 1,575 2,676 5,469 10,316 20,718 42,822 69,725 159,904 335,594 493,453
2003 16.7 18,711 30,140 628 1,545 2,606 5,349 9,876 19,464 40,006 65,655 151,336 331,293 499,499
2004 17.5 19,079 30,457 663 1,624 2,768 5,575 10,110 19,842 40,676 66,423 153,033 331,317 511,021
2005 18.4 19,048 30,436 668 1,671 2,825 5,721 10,205 19,709 40,218 65,629 153,618 328,746 518,375
2006 19.4 19,689 31,636 712 1,803 3,042 6,162 10,627 20,176 41,152 66,822 157,486 358,328 558,436
2007 20.5 20,062 31,930 740 1,883 3,167 6,441 10,916 20,527 41,898 67,361 159,765 357,695 568,516
2008 21.8 20,638 32,709 804 2,031 3,363 6,695 11,283 21,149 42,798 68,702 165,123 359,067 584,843
2009 22.4 21,001 33,154 785 2,000 3,371 6,938 11,570 21,433 43,537 70,143 168,102 355,285 596,351
2010 23.7 21,662 33,744 867 2,218 3,657 7,362 12,105 22,174 44,496 71,921 169,397 362,153 618,336
2011 24.7 22,178 33,898 902 2,317 3,825 7,579 12,608 22,949 45,473 72,672 169,992 357,621 623,517
2012 25.3 23,064 34,277 973 2,503 4,154 8,219 13,442 24,119 47,239 74,429 171,979 355,940 633,150
2013 25.8 23,691 34,468 999 2,582 4,257 8,435 14,033 24,991 48,562 75,997 173,752 359,881 642,189
2014 26.0 24,235 34,812 1,042 2,652 4,420 8,709 14,489 25,652 49,641 77,273 176,476 362,136 646,920
2015 25.3 24,077 34,642 1,014 2,641 4,452 8,773 14,463 25,291 49,160 76,822 175,220 364,824 643,974
2016 24.1 23,693 33,301 1,021 2,679 4,478 8,929 14,448 25,000 48,133 75,243 168,912 344,804 623,699
2017 23.6 24,233 33,968 1,037 2,743 4,595 9,190 14,788 25,503 49,042 76,947 172,357 346,970 631,279
Note: Workers aged 25-55. Source: RAIS 1985-2017.
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TABLE 6. CROSS-SECTIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS, WOMEN
Year Obs. Mean Std. dev. P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 P99.9 P99.99
1985 4.8 15,463 18,364 533 1,661 2,857 5,378 9,299 18,347 35,186 49,613 89,725 162,360 292,297
1986 5.4 16,417 19,630 546 1,503 2,547 5,203 9,744 19,903 38,414 53,682 95,500 170,577 266,223
1987 5.7 14,943 22,087 356 1,142 2,103 4,320 8,419 17,244 34,083 48,978 95,853 349,114 390,751
1988 6.1 15,117 20,772 257 1,049 2,228 4,415 8,304 17,418 34,025 51,686 107,098 189,608 326,275
1989 6.4 14,846 20,777 211 896 2,203 4,411 8,027 17,087 33,021 49,989 106,495 194,909 343,763
1990 6.7 12,811 17,837 208 896 1,740 3,422 6,714 15,037 29,584 43,748 90,607 166,149 246,986
1991 6.7 12,095 16,477 295 961 1,792 3,534 6,540 14,030 27,533 41,404 82,045 155,255 233,028
1992 6.6 11,734 15,371 193 841 1,825 3,708 6,617 13,605 26,583 39,789 75,928 143,422 217,458
1993 7.0 12,953 18,102 157 794 1,976 3,984 7,028 14,575 28,827 44,341 92,373 170,239 253,249
1994 7.4 14,173 18,880 240 1,042 2,036 3,981 7,491 16,652 33,813 49,774 93,499 168,105 249,112
1995 7.9 16,297 22,808 473 1,269 2,166 4,330 8,455 18,752 38,458 57,993 112,305 214,995 300,946
1996 8.0 16,631 22,796 545 1,378 2,313 4,630 8,977 19,368 38,579 57,574 111,614 221,920 322,283
1997 8.2 16,970 23,283 566 1,457 2,458 4,757 9,182 19,679 39,252 58,677 115,559 222,966 331,703
1998 8.5 17,766 24,633 596 1,557 2,660 5,012 9,538 20,624 40,835 60,858 123,556 238,938 355,660
1999 8.7 17,303 23,873 594 1,545 2,648 5,003 9,341 19,935 39,492 58,859 120,402 232,289 338,864
2000 9.0 17,418 24,775 584 1,503 2,611 4,967 9,221 19,764 39,607 59,878 124,658 244,296 349,034
2001 9.7 17,251 25,295 579 1,506 2,606 5,041 9,014 19,182 39,091 58,914 125,432 266,031 397,658
2002 10.2 17,137 25,356 581 1,520 2,644 5,069 8,893 18,854 38,998 58,563 124,371 270,983 412,300
2003 10.7 16,118 23,989 560 1,491 2,576 5,029 8,458 17,511 36,165 54,682 116,725 261,294 415,282
2004 11.3 16,373 24,203 582 1,552 2,667 5,197 8,645 17,716 36,739 55,557 118,862 257,566 410,678
2005 12.1 16,334 24,289 580 1,536 2,648 5,317 8,604 17,408 36,366 55,475 119,903 261,916 399,578
2006 12.9 17,070 25,649 611 1,641 2,858 5,822 8,931 18,032 37,930 57,489 124,361 289,308 430,627
2007 13.7 17,407 26,145 624 1,658 2,873 6,140 9,150 18,300 38,647 58,693 127,225 294,307 428,367
2008 14.8 17,732 26,805 644 1,698 2,913 6,257 9,323 18,521 39,294 59,754 130,521 302,464 446,000
2009 15.5 18,222 27,248 655 1,729 2,981 6,719 9,675 19,014 40,297 61,288 134,710 300,453 443,299
2010 16.6 18,580 27,601 690 1,805 3,097 6,955 9,981 19,272 40,845 62,223 136,126 303,894 449,789
2011 17.7 18,812 27,503 715 1,856 3,186 7,076 10,270 19,620 41,436 62,755 135,569 298,549 461,458
2012 18.6 19,580 27,449 768 2,010 3,456 7,675 10,907 20,624 43,193 64,598 136,492 290,728 439,453
2013 19.3 19,942 27,655 788 2,089 3,580 7,824 11,273 21,049 43,780 65,591 137,725 290,507 451,093
2014 19.8 20,460 27,979 825 2,190 3,761 7,996 11,718 21,772 44,812 66,901 139,581 290,801 456,351
2015 19.6 20,616 28,076 843 2,318 4,004 8,141 11,855 21,794 44,813 66,863 139,654 298,356 465,040
2016 18.9 20,621 27,094 886 2,455 4,221 8,442 12,094 22,078 44,399 65,828 135,633 281,736 447,726
2017 18.7 21,179 27,723 912 2,541 4,386 8,772 12,532 22,613 45,282 67,255 139,690 280,049 459,173
Note: Workers aged 25-55. Source: RAIS 1985-2017.
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A.2 Additional figures for Brazil’s formal sector
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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FIGURE 25. EVOLUTION OF RESIDUAL EARNINGS PERCENTILES, MEN AND WOMEN POOLED
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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FIGURE 28. EVOLUTION OF EARNINGS SHARES, RELATIVE TO 1995




















































































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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FIGURE 35. EVOLUTION OF EARNINGS MOBILITY OVER THE LIFE CYCLE, BY GENDER
(A) MEN
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
FIGURE 36. EVOLUTION OF EARNINGS MOBILITY OVER TIME, BY GENDER
(A) MEN
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: RAIS 1985–2017.
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A.3 Additional figures for Brazil’s informal sector
FIGURE 41. EVOLUTION OF SECTORAL FLOW RATES, BY ORIGIN SECTOR










































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
FIGURE 42. CROSS-SECTIONAL HETEROGENEITY IN SECTORAL FLOW RATES, BY ORIGIN SECTOR












































Note: Workers aged 25–55. Source: PME 2002–2015.
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